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New interventions 
and sustainable   
solutions       
Reappraising illegal artisanal 
mining in South Africa    
Despite its contribution to the South African economy, the South African mining industry is plagued 
by illegal artisanal mining (IAM). Although artisanal mining was recognised as a means to alleviate 
poverty after 1994, current legislation criminalises such work. This article reviews the limited literature 
on IAM in South Africa to show that there is poor synergy between mining industry stakeholders. It 
recommends two theoretical perspectives from which to reappraise the underlying causes of IAM, 




Illegal artisanal mining (IAM) is a serious 
environmental and social problem in South 
Africa.1 ‘Illegal’ mining is an act of mining 
that contravenes the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act (MPRDA). 
Despite its illegality, many scholars believe 
such mining has an important role to play 
in rural economic development.2 The global 
demand for gold has triggered a surge in illegal 
mining in various parts of the world, including 
Indonesia, Venezuela (where 91% of gold 
is produced illegally), Colombia (80%) and 
Ecuador (77%).3 
After agriculture, more South Africans are 
employed in the mining sector than in any 
other.4 The industry provides 500 000 direct 
and 800 000 indirect jobs, and contributes 
16% to the country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP).5 Nevertheless, gold and diamonds are 
frequently extracted informally, with serious 
environmental consequences.6 While this harm 
is done, scholars have struggled to quantify it, 
as there is no common international or national 
definition of what illegal mining entails.7 
Research on IAM in South Africa is limited.8 
Available statistics are primarily rough 
estimates, and thus lack credibility.9 The 
resulting misunderstandings over unregulated 
and informal mining impede solutions to 
related challenges.10 
Aside from Thornton, few scholars have 
explored IAM in South Africa with any 
nuance. His work offers a groundbreaking 
interdisciplinary approach to IAM.11 He 
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posits that illegal artisanal miners (IAMs) are 
largely misrepresented by the South African 
government and media.12 As a consequence, 
fragmented and parochial interventions are 
adopted. Inevitably these are generalised, and 
often involve violent crackdowns, the imposition 
of penalties and the marginalisation of IAMs, 
with little consideration as to how they might 
otherwise earn their livelihoods.
The purpose of this review is to develop an 
integrated approach in reappraising IAM 
in South Africa. It draws from local and 
international best practices, and aims to 
answer two questions, namely: what is a viable 
approach to IAM, and what are international 
best practices for achieving sustainable 
artisanal mining?
The need for networked governance
Mineral and financial losses due to IAM are 
widespread, despite collaborative efforts 
between the South African Police Service 
(SAPS) and the mining industry’s security 
personnel. Coetzee and Horn suggest that 
a lack of context-specific, integrated and 
standardised methods for managing illegal 
activities has perpetuated the problem.13
Solving highly complex problems such as IAM 
requires cross-sector cooperation, 
organisation and governance.14 This must be 
implemented alongside capacity building 
(e.g. training for IAMs) and exploration of 
contextually relevant solutions. The 
integration of capacities and resources is best 
achieved through the networked governance 
perspective, where a culture of close 
cooperation between government, local 
communities, law enforcement agencies, the 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF), 
SAPS, civil society organisations (CSOs) and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is 
instilled. However, this cooperation needs to be 
aligned with other global and regional initiatives 
such as the Communities of Artisanal and 
Small-scale Mining (CASM) Charter, Yaoundé 
Vision and Africa’s Mining Vision, wherein the 
practice of IAM is not criminalised but is 
encouraged as a niche source for 
sustainable livelihoods.15 
Similarly, interventions will benefit from 
collaborative arrangements at the global level 
through the United Nations (UN), World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund; at the regional 
level through the Southern African Development 
Community; and at the domestic level. 
Collaborative arrangements can be viewed 
both as bottom-up and multi-level approaches. 
Operationally, government (national and local) 
needs to spearhead the reappraisal of IAM 
through poverty alleviation strategies. Tactically, 
all stakeholders should be included as much as 
is practically possible. 
This article uses the theoretical models of 
networked governance and capitalism in 
crafting and understanding a context-specific 
approach to reappraising IAM. 
Conceptual analysis
IAM may be understood differently by 
different people in different countries. This 
article understands it as artisanal and small-
scale mining (ASM), which, when informal, is 
described as informal artisanal mining (IAM). 
In Ghana, IAM is referred to as galamsey, in 
Mongolia it is referred to as ninja mining, while 
in South Africa illegal miners are referred to 
as zama zamas – an isiZulu term meaning ‘try 
and try again’.16 Because there is no common 
definition of IAM, Zvarivadza asserts that such 
activities are largely attributed to informal and 
unregulated ASM.17 Formal or legal ASM occurs 
when companies comply with environmental 
and health-related mining regulations, while 
informal ASM (IAM) occurs when they do 
not. Importantly, small-scale mining can be 
regulated like large-scale mining but, as a 
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result of widespread flouting of artisanal mining 
legislation, is often regarded as IAM.18
ASM is as important as large-scale mining as 
a provider of livelihoods in poverty-stricken 
communities.19 The same holds true for IAM. 
Hentschel et al. contend that ASM relates 
to ‘mining by individuals, groups, families or 
cooperatives with minimal or no mechanization, 
largely in the informal (illegal) sector of the 
market’.20 They acknowledge the challenges 
in differentiating ‘artisanal mining’ that is purely 
manual/informal and very small in scale from 
‘small-scale mining’, involving mechanisation 
and somewhat larger scales. 
Characteristics to be considered in defining the 
type of mining include, inter alia, ‘production 
volume, number of people per productive unit, 
intensity (volume) of capital employed, labour 
productivity, size of mine claim, quantity of 
reserves, sales volume, operational continuity, 
operational reliability, and duration of the 
mining cycle’.21 
IAM can occur on the surface or underground, 
and in either formal or abandoned/closed 
mines.22 Thornton offers four key challenges 
with regard to how IAM is conceptualised. First, 
he contends, it is not clear what legislation or 
by-laws criminalise IAM. Second, if miners are 
considered trespassers it is difficult to identify 
them among the many other people using 
informal pathways that criss-cross mineral-
rich land. Third, South Africa’s surface laws 
do not relate to its underground resources. 
Finally, IAMs are not ‘stealing gold’ from actively 
worked industrial mines.23 So how does one 
properly define an illegal miner?
One way of defining IAMs is to consider 
them as those who contravene the Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
(MPRDA) in South Africa. ASM is not only 
recognised as a sub-sector of formal mining but 
is also considered a poverty alleviation strategy 
acceptable in terms of the MPRDA.24 The act 
places all minerals under custodianship of the 
state, and requires that anyone wanting to 
extract minerals must first apply for a permit 
from the state.25 Mining activities are illegal 
when they fail to comply with the required 
permit, health and safety obligations. In this 
regard, Section 2 of the Mine Health and 
Safety Act (MHSA) prescribes three conditions 
that govern both operational and dormant 
mining activities.26    
First, the employer of a mine needs to provide 
conditions for safe operations and a healthy 
working environment.27 If a mine is not being 
worked, but a closure certificate has not been 
issued, the owner must take reasonable steps 
to ‘continually prevent injuries, ill-health, loss 
of life or damage of any kind from occurring at 
or because of the mine’. The act also requires 
that the holder of a mining concession apply 
for a closure certificate upon, among others, 
the lapsing, abandonment or cancellation of 
the concession. 
Taking the above into account, it may be 
posited that the fundamental difference 
between legal miners and illegal miners is 
that illegal miners do not pay taxes, lack 
permits and environmental impact analyses, 
and have lower labour standards.28 They 
also lack the capital and equipment required 
for large-scale mining.
Theoretical and ideological 
perspectives
Network governance 
Various theoretical and empirical efforts 
have informed recommendations aimed at 
reappraising IAM. It has proven difficult to 
deal with IAM where strategies and resources 
are not integrated across and between 
stakeholders. For this reason, network 
governance is appealing.
Network governance sees actors with shared 
interests come together as co-producers 
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of governance strategies.29 The resulting 
accumulation of competencies and knowledge 
can help overcome complex challenges.30 
Network governance proposes that NGOs, 
the private sector, scientific networks, local 
communities, CBOs, CSOs, and regional and 
international institutions collaborate to foster 
reciprocal trust in cooperative rather than 
top-down partnerships.31 Of course, because 
such synergies are difficult to create and 
manage, network governance can be difficult 
to implement. 
Capitalism
Capitalism is an economic system that allows 
private actors to own and control property 
to serve their own interests. In democratic 
capitalist states the activities of private actors 
are bound by the rule of law. At first glance, this 
appears to support equality. But, as Anatole 
France noted with unabashed irony over a 
hundred years ago: ‘In its majestic equality, the 
law forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under 
bridges, beg in the streets and steal loaves 
of bread.’32 As a result, rich and poor do not 
begin their days on an equal economic footing. 
To this end, Merkel maintains that capitalism 
and democracy follow different logics, the 
former promoting the unequal distribution of 
property and goods, the latter, equal rights and 
the wellbeing of all.33 
Democracy has been condemned for 
increasing economic inequality in South Africa 
and elsewhere.34 Apartheid’s race-based 
capitalism benefitted the white minority and 
marginalised the black majority.35 Importantly, 
mining and racial domination have been central 
to South African capitalism, but its harm is 
not easy to undo.36 In mid-2017, under the 
guise of addressing this, Mineral Resources 
Minister Mosebenzi Zwane proposed a 
highly controversial mining charter, calling 
for increases in black ownership of mines by 
4% to 30% within a year.37 The charter also 
requires that 14% of mining shares should be 
given to black entrepreneurs.38 While change is 
imperative, the minister’s move may be self-
serving as he tries to leverage populist calls for 
‘radical economic transformation’ to further his 
own political career. While the proposed charter 
was immediately rejected by the Chamber of 
Mines of South Africa and relevant trade unions, 
its proposal still resulted in an estimated R50 
billion in stock being lost overnight.39 
South Africa’s broader neoliberal macro-
economic policy, Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR), has also impacted the 
economy. While it sought to redistribute wealth 
through job creation and economic growth, 
this has not been achieved.40 In August 
2017 Statistics South Africa announced that 
more than 30 million South Africans lived 
in poverty.41 Yet there are no obvious 
alternatives to capitalism after the collapse of  
Soviet-era socialism. How can South Africa’s 
mining industry benefit the poor? Might IAM 
hold an answer?
Explanations for IAM in South Africa
The Chamber of Mines contends that IAM 
takes place on the surface and underground, 
at closed, abandoned and operating mines.42 
It posits that urgent steps need to be taken to 
address a rise in IAM in South Africa and the 
continent more broadly.43 Banchirigah confirms 
that economic stimulus strategies employed 
by governments in sub-Saharan Africa have 
not offered sustainable results, but caused 
environmental and social harm.44 In South 
Africa, it has been suggested that IAMs are 
misrepresented as poor, ignorant migrants from 
other African countries.45 Such representations 
weaken efforts to curb illegal activities, by 
stigmatising rather than promoting support for 
these miners.
IAM should be recognised and regulated, and 
understood as a product of particular contexts 
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and factors. According to Banchirigah, these 
contexts and factors include persistent poverty 
and unemployment. The presence of these 
factors in neighbouring African countries, and 
South Africa’s relative wealth, attract job seekers 
to South Africa. Those unable to find work may 
resort to IAM as a form of ‘self-employment’. 
The chamber estimates that 70% of arrested 
IAMs are from neighbouring countries.46 
There is no connection between ordinary 
policing and IAM. SAPS officials are not 
specifically trained to police IAM. Yet, the 
chamber has called on the SAPS to deal with 
IAM criminality, such as the bribing of mine 
security personnel to gain entry to shafts.47  
Consequences of IAM in South Africa
If IAM is not reappraised it can lead to 
undesirable consequences, such as those listed 
by Zvarivadza in Table 1.  
International responses
Internationally, several strategies have been 
implemented to address IAM. One notable 
strategy is the CASM Charter, a global initiative 
launched in March 2001 with the aim of: 
• Reducing the occupational health and safety 
risks to miners
• Improving the policy environment and 
institutional arrangements governing small-
scale mining
Social Environmental Economic Safety and health
Crime Deforestation Lack of collateral 
security
High fatality rate
Sex work and spread 
of sexually transmitted 
diseases
Pollution of water 
bodies
Difficulty in obtaining 
information for 
planning purposes




Soil erosion Rent-capturing 
difficulties
Lack of protective 
clothing
Neglect of human 
rights
Siltation of rivers Lack of education and 
professionalism
Unsupported or poorly 
supported mining 
activities
Conflict and lack of 
security
Dust and noise 
pollution
High grading of mining 
operations
Unsafe working tools
Child labour Land degradation Failure to adapt 
to technological 
advances
Chief reliance on 
natural ventilation
Denigration of cultural 
and ethical values
River diversion Mineral rush effect 
(Tragedy of Commons)
Poor lighting
Destruction of cultural 
heritage sites






Gender discrimination Destruction of 
biodiversity
Short-sighted planning Exposure to dust and 
dangerous gases
Limited social amenities Poor disposal of mine 
tailings
Corruption Insufficient safe 
drinking water
Table 1: Challenges posed by informal/unregulated mining activities
Source: Zvarivadza48
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• Increasing the productivity and improving the 
livelihoods of miners
• Working to advance alternative livelihoods 
through effective use of their natural resource 
capital, in part, by conservation of biodiversity 
in IAM areas49  
The Yaoundé Vision initiated by the African 
Union in 2002 and the Mining Minerals and 
Sustainable Development (MMSD), published 
in the same year, provide a roadmap in 
terms of how governments on the continent 
can assist ASM initiatives.50 The Yaoundé 
Vision operationalised Africa’s Mining Vision, 
which seeks to transform mining into a 
knowledge-based economy. It identifies IAM 
as the backbone of many rural economies 
and a source of livelihoods.51 It seeks to 
build grassroots capacity and growth, and 
encourages inter-linkages with the broader 
social economy.52 
Sustainable employment would most certainly 
improve the livelihoods of illegal miners. 
Creating jobs for low-skilled workers in formal 
ASM and rural areas would dissuade illegal 
activities. Since IAM is primarily about the 
search for employment, Banchirigah and 
Hilson have recommended strong support for 
agrarian-orientated activities in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.53 In Ghana, re-agrarian-orientated 
activities have already been shown to be a 
viable strategy to reduce poverty, one of the 
push factors driving IAM. 
At the more traditional security front, companies 
in China and Turkey have used satellite-borne, 
repeat-pass differential synthetic aperture 
radar interferometry (D-InSAR) to detect on- or 
in-ground IAM activities.54 The challenge with 
D-InSAR is to differentiate between legal and 
illegal mining activities. Relatedly, Synthetic 
Aperture Radar (SAR) satellites are able to 
ensure long-term surveillance of specific 
mine sites.55 
An integrated model
Reappraising IAM in South Africa requires 
context-specific approaches tailored to 
improving the socioeconomic conditions that 
drive people to such activities. To start, an 
empirical needs analysis is required in order 
to understand what pushes IAMs to the work 
(push factors) and what attracts them to IAM 
(pull factors). It is important to find out from 
IAMs themselves how they can be assisted, 
instead of using a top-down approach. 
Best practices combine the use of surveillance 
technology such as D-InSAR with the 
implementation of strategies such as Africa’s 
Mining Vision and objectives, MMSD, the CASM 
Charter, and agrarian-orientated activities. If 
implemented in South Africa, the poor and 
marginalised must be consulted as part of a 
‘whole society’ intervention, which is inclusive of 
all stakeholders.56
In accordance with a network governance 
proposition, the South African government 
has in place national strategies linked with 
international initiatives. No progress can be 
made within the mining sector if there are no 
empowerment projects to alleviate poverty. 
Essentially, capitalism does not encourage 
compromise, but rather unidirectional, 
hierarchical decision-making.57 Conversely, the 
South African government’s black economic 
empowerment (BEE) policies introduced in 2003 
(subsequently known as broad-based black 
economic empowerment) are an important 
step in reducing economic inequality, as are 
its affirmative action goals. BEE has sought 
to increase black participation and ownership 
of the economy, including the mining industry, 
but has only benefitted a small, often politically 
connected elite (the ‘New Elite’).58 According to 
Jeffery, this elite accounts for only 15% of the 
black population.59 To correct this, regulated, 
procedurally fair expansion of black ownership 
of mining is necessary for South Africa as a 
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whole, for neighbouring states, and for the 
future of IAMs in particular. 
A network governance intervention should 
include the use of advanced technology such 
as D-InSAR and surveillance cameras, along 
with strengthening the security cluster with 
highly skilled personnel. A reporting system that 
includes a monitoring and evaluation capacity is 
needed to assess progress. 
Network governance interventions
Because IAM is driven by poverty and a need 
for rural economic development, scholars have 
advocated for both proactive and reactive 
interventions, summarised here:60 
•  All stakeholders, in consultation with 
government and the Chamber of Mines, need 
to support initiatives to reduce health hazards 
and environmental degradation. 
•  Poverty alleviation initiatives targeting artisanal 
miners must be implemented. These should 
include providing IAMs with skills that improve 
their prospects of employment in the formal 
sector, specifically, for non-South Africans, in 
their countries of origin. 
•  Subsidies and financing should be made 
available for ASM together with business 
development aid, such as technology transfer 
and managerial and accounting support. This 
should be provided by government, the CM 
and civil society.  
•  Partnerships should be fostered between 
ASM and large-scale mining.
•  Corruption in government should be 
 stamped out, and a strong legal framework, 
which balances the above development goals 
with strong checks and balances, should 
 be instituted.
• The ASM sector should be formalised and 
registered. This will allow ASM to become 
self-sustainable (while remaining 
 networked) and recognised as a legitimate 
livelihood strategy.61 
Conclusion and recommendations
This article has argued for a network 
governance approach to understanding and 
supporting, rather than criminalising, ASM. 
IAM, it is suggested, can be viewed both as 
a governance and security challenge, and as 
an economic opportunity or survival strategy. 
Criminalisation of ASM, as is the case with IAM, 
is unlikely to yield long-term societal gains. 
Instead, it exposes IAMs to various 
risks, obscures the root causes of IAM, and 
leaves these unaddressed, resulting in the 
further marginalisation of impoverished 
rural communities. 
Network governance models predict that 
long-term stability is not possible without the 
investment and collaboration of a broad range 
of actors. These include government, civil 
society, and international, regional and local 
organisations. These groups’ resources and 
programmes should, ideally, be strategically 
aligned and integrated in ways that produce 
holistic, sustainable solutions to IAM.
Understanding the daily lives of IAMs is crucial. 
Without this understanding, ill-conceived  
policies such as the 2017 mining charter, BEE 
and GEAR are bound to fail. New policies 
should be formulated and implemented in ways 
that do not reinforce racial discrimination or 
inequality, but rather grow an inclusive mining 
sector and general economy.
Since IAM affects many countries in the sub-
Saharan region, regional cooperation networks 
must be developed to understand the push and 
pull factors driving this sub-type of small-scale 
mining. For instance, South African companies 
and authorities may need to invest in the 
economies of neighbouring states to provide 
alternatives to IAM and related migration.
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It is difficult to deal with IAM amid South Africa’s 
great economic inequality. Thus, gradual 
transfer of skills and ownership in the mining 
sector, as in others, is required in ways that 
do not incentivise or allow room for corruption 
or political capture. The mining sector and 
government must do more to support 
communities surrounding major mines.
Finally, there should be more involvement of 
universities and research organisations that 
understand the plight and the needs of IAMs, 
and can offer effective solutions to the state 
of IAM.  
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